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PRESERVING FABLED AMATEURISM: THE BENEFITS
OF THE NCAA’S ADOPTION OF THE OLYMPIC
AMATEURISMMODEL
John Kealey*
I’m not only saying that it is a right for a [collegiate athlete]
to play summer ball for money . . . but I’m going further than
that. . . . [They are] failing in [their] duty to [them]self and
to the world if [they do] not take advantage of it and use it to
the best of [their] ability.
– G. Stanley Hall, President, Clark University1
After a century of denying student-athletes from receiving
compensation outside the cost of attendance for their athletic
contributions to their respective universities, the NCAA finally
announced it would change its amateurism rule. The change came
in response to multiple class action lawsuits and, more recently,
legislation from many states, namely California and New York,
which would have mandated that universities do not interfere with
student-athletes desire to commercially exploit their own names,
image, and likenesses. However, these statutes are potentially
flawed in that each could exacerbate or perpetuate the anti-trust and
first amendment issues inherent to the current amateurism rule.
Further, the NCAA’s proposed change to its amateurism rule
* Brooklyn Law School (J.D. Candidate 2021); University of Colorado Boulder
(B.A. 2017). Thank you to all the hard-working collegiate and professional
athletes who continue to provide entertainment, a critical platform for civil rights
reform and special family memories. Special thanks to the Journal of Law and
Policy for their detailed work and support; but most importantly, my late father,
James Kealey, for teaching me about the joys of sports and the nuances of editing
a composed paper.
1 RONALD A. SMITH, PAY FOR PLAY: A HISTORY OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE
ATHLETIC REFORM 56–57 (Benjamin G. Rader & Randy Roberts eds., 2011).
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includes language limiting the student-athlete’s right to self-
monetization in a way that is more restrictive than the proposed
legislation. To shift away from the amateurism model, scholars have
suggested that the NCAA use the Olympic model as a guide. These
suggestions were salient in the aftermath of the O’Bannon and
Keller decisions and continue to be in light of the current proposed
legislation. This note examines new efforts being made to regulate
amateurism in sports and finds them wanting. It then turns to a
discussion calling for the NCAA to adopt the Olympic model of
amateurism to ensure student athletes finally get a piece of the
NCAA’s century long windfall.
INTRODUCTION
Beginning as a non-unified group of universities competing in
sports solely for pride,2 NCAA collegiate athletics has grown to a
billion-dollar enterprise tasked with unifying its student-athletes and
their respective universities in sharing their newfound wealth.3
Presidents of a select few colleges, “lacking status, unity, or real
power to lead intercollegiate reform,”4 founded the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) on two core principles:
(1) all participating athletes must be students, and (2) all
participating athletes must be amateurs.5 The new organization
defined an amateur as “one who participates in competitive physical
sports only for the pleasure, and the physical, mental, moral, and
social benefits directly derived therefrom.”6
2 Id. at 2.
3 Arash Afshar, Collegiate Athletes: The Conflict Between NCAA
Amateurism and a Student Athlete’s Right of Publicity, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV.
101, 104 (2014).
4 SMITH, supra note 1, at 52.
5 Testimony of Defendants’ Witness, Mark Emmert at 1728–29, O’Bannon
v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. C-09-
3329).
6 Afshar, supra note 3, at 109.
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Student athletes know the NCAA is a billion-dollar enterprise
built on their talents,7 creating a frustration that is exacerbated by
colleges’ distribution of the revenues. As of 2017, the NCAA
cleared an annual revenue of over one billion dollars.8 In 2018, the
Department of Education reported $14 billion in total college sports
revenue.9 Star college athletes bring in significant revenue for their
respective schools, with recent estimates concluding a “top level
college football player generates $538,760 per year[,] or over $2
million over a four year period.”10 The majority of college sports
revenue is closely held amongst the Power Five conferences,11
which represent just 3% of schools competing in the NCAA, yet
bring in 54% of college athletics revenue, mostly through massive
football programs.12 Unsurprisingly, the majority of NCAA schools’
athletic departments are not self-sustaining;13 “as few as twelve
athletic departments make a profit.”14 In order to build varied and
competitive athletic programs, universities allocate income from
7 Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Reports Revenues of More than $1 Billion in 2017,
USA TODAY (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college
/2018/03/07/ncaa-reports-revenues-more-than-1-billion-2017/402486002.
8 Id.
9 SEN. CHRIS MURPHY, MADNESS INC. HOW EVERYONE IS GETTING RICH
OFF COLLEGE SPORTS—EXCEPT THE PLAYERS 3 (2019), https://
www.murphy.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/NCAA%20Report_FINAL.pdf.
10 The analysis further discusses studies which show that the net gain for a
university—after deducting the value of a college athlete’s scholarship—sits
around $20,000, and that the average incremental profit from what the study
defined as a “good player” was about $150,000 per annum. However, the article
recognizes it is “difficult for any study to peg a specific dollar amount of revenue
to a specific student athlete.” Kenneth L. Shropshire, The Erosion of the NCAA
Amateurism Model, 14 ANTITRUST 46, 47 (2000).
11 The Power Five conferences include the Atlantic Coast Conference,
Southeastern Conference, Big Ten, Big 12, and Pac–12. MURPHY, supra note 9,
at 5.
12 Id.
13 Afshar, supra note 3, at 106; see Michael T. Jones, Real Accountability:
The NCAA Can No Longer Evade Antitrust Liability Through Amateurism After
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 56 B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 79, 90 (2015) (“[O]ther courts
should follow the example of O’Bannon’s analysis of the legal merits and
economic implications of the NCAA’s amateurism polices, and continue to trend
away from blind deference to the NCAA.”).
14 MURPHY, supra note 9, at 12.
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popular sports—primarily college football—to team facilities
construction, coaching staff and other less profitable athletic
programs.15 However, in the Power Five conference, the imbalance
between money allocated to scholarships as opposed to coaches’
salaries and “athletic palaces” is significant.16 “Between 2004 and
2014, Power Five conferences nearly doubled facilities spending,”
which student-athlete advocates characterize as “[s]hrine-building
aimed at seducing teenagers” into generating more revenue for their
schools.17 Further, Power Five conferences allocated 16% of
revenue to coaches’ salaries in contrast with 12% to athletic
scholarships for the student-athletes whose labor generates the
revenue.18
Student-athletes and critics of the NCAA’s amateurism standard
also point to the conspicuous irony that, under amateurism, famous
head coaches, such as Duke University’s Mike Krzyzewski19 and
Ohio State University’s Urban Meyer, are paid seven figures
indirectly by apparel companies as a part of their school contracts.20
The top 100 Division I NCAA football coaches also command
impressive salaries, ranging from $360,000 to over $9 million.21
Past head coaches have even negotiated apparel contracts, including
one case where 98% of the contract was paid directly to the head
coach of the program.22 Yet, universities refuse to allow student-
athletes the same freedom to accept endorsement money.
Although some might argue that a student athlete’s scholarships
and financial aid are themselves benefits, others opine that
15 Id. at 4–7, 10.
16 Id. at 7.
17 Id. at 9.
18 Id. at 7.
19 Shropshire, supra note 10, at 47 (explaining that in 1993 Nike sought to
lure Duke basketball players away from Adidas by paying coach Mike
Krzyzewski $375,000 per year and a $1 million bonus).
20 Matthew Kish, How Nike Funnels Money to College Football Coaches,
PORTLAND BUS. J. (Sept. 3, 2013, 5:20 PM), https://www.bizjournals.com
/portland/blog/threads_and_laces/2013/09/how-nike-funnels-money-football-
coaches.html (explaining that Ohio State’s coach Urban Meyer, at the time, was
paid “$1.4 million each year as part of the school’s contract with Nike”).
21 Steve Berkowitz et al., NCAA Salaries, USA TODAY, https://
sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
22 MURPHY, supra note 9, at 6.
PRESERVING FABLED AMATEURISM 329
scholarships help disguise the NCAA’s scheme of forcing athletes
to attend college as “the only route to the pros.”23 Athletes, such as
the Los Angeles Lakers’ LeBron James, were previously able to
enter professional league drafts24 directly after high school.25 This is
no longer the case with professional basketball or football, as
athletes must complete one or three years, respectively, in college
athletics prior to entering each league’s respective draft.26 Because
young athletes may no longer pursue other routes to professional
leagues, some modern anti-amateurism advocates have urged states
to “recognize [that] their own citizens’ rights [to choose when to
play professionally] have been usurped by the college sports cartel
operating out [of] Indianapolis.”27 The shared frustration of anti-
amateurism advocates centers on the NCAA receiving a monetary
windfall from student-athletes’ talents.28
Some of these advocates have achieved tangible results by
succeeding in lawsuits against the NCAA for creating products
which use their name and likeness for profit—specifically in the area
of video games.29 Some state legislatures have also taken notice of
23 ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND
CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 199 (1999).
24 The professional draft is the most common route to a career in the NBA,
NFL, NHL, and MLB, where all teams in a given league select young athletes in
sequential order, in a selection known as a “draft pick.” Estimated Probability of
Competing in Professional Athletics, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about
/resources/research/estimated-probability-competing-professional-athletics (last
visited Jan. 2, 2021).
25 See The Shop Uninterrupted: Season 2, Episode 4 (HBO 2019) (depicting
Mr. James explaining how he entered the NBA draft without attending college,
which the NBA no longer allows).
26 Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The Amateur Sports Draft: The Best Means to the
End?, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 1, 1–4 (1995).
27 Joseph Nardone, New York Senator Proposes Bill to Have College
Athletes Paid Directly by Schools, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2019, 4:28 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/josephnardone/2019/09/18/new-york-senator-proposes-
bill-to-have-college-athletes-paid-directly-by-schools/#4dd2f9534d17.
28 MURPHY, supra note 9, at 2.
29 See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049
(9th Cir. 2015) (finding that players, whose likenesses were used in video games,
were injured by their inability to receive compensation under NCAA rules); see
also In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d
1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that that a video game developer’s use of
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these injustices. For example, in 2019, California sought to resolve
the bar on compensation for collegiate athletes by enacting the Fair
Pay to Play Act.30 This Act followed some scholars’ suggestion that
college sports should adopt the Olympic model,31 whereby student-
athletes may financially benefit off their name and likeness via
endorsement deals.32 However, unlike the Olympic model,
California’s Act33 does not provide student-athletes equivalent
latitude to choose their endorsement deals, because they cannot
conflict with those of their universities.34 Other states have since
followed in California’s footsteps.35 In 2019, New York proposed
legislation which attempted to mandate that universities directly pay
student-athletes a portion of ticket sales.36 Eventually, the
student athletes’ names and likenesses in its video game franchise was not
protected by the First Amendment, thus California’s anti-SLAPP suit did not bar
student athletes’ right of publicity suit).
30 S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); see Charlotte Carroll,
Tracking NCAA Fair Play Legislation Across the Country, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED
(Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/10/02/tracking-ncaa-fair-play-
image-likeness-
laws (explaining that the bill is often referred to as the California Fair Pay to Play
Act).
31 See Afshar, supra note 3, at 132–33 (comparing the current NCAA
amateurism model to Olympic athlete’s ability to self-monetize); Patrick Hruby,
The Olympics Show Why College Sports Should Give Up on Amateurism, THE
ATLANTIC (July 25, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment
/archive/2012/07/the-olympics-show-why-college-sports-should-give-up-on-
amateurism/260275/ (explaining the Olympic shift away from amateurism and
why the NCAA problem is similar).
32 See Dan Murphy, Bill to Allow Athletes to Profit from Name Advances,
ESPN (July 9, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/27156972
/bill-allow-athletes-profit-name-advances (reporting that the Fair Pay to Play Act
was approved by the state assembly’s Committee on Higher Education).
33 Cal. S.B. 206 § 67456(e)(1).
34 Id. (“A student athlete shall not enter into a contract providing
compensation to the athlete for use of the athlete’s name, image, or likeness if a
provision of the contract is in conflict with a provision of the athlete’s team
contract.”).
35 See Caroll, supra note 30 (listing states that are considering, drafting, or
proposing legislation that is similar to California’s Fair Pay to Play Act).
36 S.B. 6722B, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6438-a(8) (N.Y. 2019).
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nationwide momentum favoring reform to student athlete
compensation forced the NCAA’s hand.37
The passage of California’s Act and growing pressure across the
country motivated the NCAA’s announcement of student-athlete
compensation reform.38 In October 2019, it announced it would
consider rule changes to allow student-athletes to profit from their
names and likenesses by 2021.39 However, this announcement did
not specify the model by which the NCAA would enable players to
receive these profits.40 Moreover, the organization has since
suspended a player for taking a direct payment (or “loans”) related
to his participation in college athletics, even when it derived from a
friendly relationships made prior to college.41 Essentially, college
sports is at a cross-roads with a proper solution that still seems far
from determined.42
Part I of this Note details the NCAA’s current amateurism
model, exploring its origins and development. Part II provides the
historical background of the Olympic shift from an amateur standard
to allowing athletes to receive compensation for uses of their names
and likenesses. Part III discusses the caselaw that has formed the
parameters of constitutional protection of student-athletes’ names
37 See Steve Almasy et al., NCAA Says Athletes May Profit from Name,
Image and Likeness, CNN (Oct. 29, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://www.cnn.com
/2019/10/29/us/ncaa-athletes-compensation/index.html (reporting that, in
response to state legislation, the NCAA intended to devise a plan allowing
student-athletes to profit off their names and likeness).
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 See id. (reporting that the NCAA had not settled on a replacement for the
amateurism model).
41 See Sources: Ohio State Expects 4-Game Ban for Chase Young, ESPN
(Nov. 9, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/28040392
/sources-ohio-state-expects-4-game-ban-chase-young (reporting that former Ohio
State football star Chase Young had been suspended for accepting a loan from a
family friend).
42 See Almasy et al., supra note 37 (“Figuring out all the details of [allowing
players to profit off their name and likeness], it’s going to be a challenge. It’s a
much more complex issue than most people see it as. I think schools are going to
be able to work through this process and come up with rules that make . . . great
sense for the student athletes and allow universities to continue their collegiate
model of athletics.”).
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and likenesses.43 Part IV details other litigative attempts at spurring
compensation reform, examining student-athletes’ failed efforts to
be treated as employees of their respective schools or the NCAA.44
Part V evaluates and identifies the major problems written into
proposed states’ legislation, including conflicts with seminal case
law, antitrust, and first amendment issues. Finally, Part VI suggests
a solution to vindicate student-athletes’ rights by incorporating the
Olympic amateurism model into proposed legislation.
I. THE NCAA’S CURRENT AMATEURISMMODEL
Initially, the NCAA adopted amateurism as a principled concept,
meant to keep all university teams on a level playing field.45
Originally, the NCAA relied on universities themselves to enforce
this honor code. Its first bylaws established:
There should be no participation if [the athlete is] not
taking a full schedule of classes, had ever received
money for playing, had already participated for four
years, and had transferred and not remained
athletically inactive until [they] attended for one
year. There was a specific rule that prohibited “any
football player” from participating again if he left
school without attending two-thirds of the previous
year.46
For over a century, the NCAA has contended that amateurism is one
if its bedrock principles.47 Athletes are meant to play for their school
43 See generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049
(9th Cir. 2015) (refusing to dismiss an anti-trust suit against NCAA on behalf of
the student-athletes for the NCAA’s profiting off a videogame franchise which
contained student-athlete avatars).
44 See, e.g., Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 910
(9th Cir. 2019) (holding NCAA athletes were not employees of the NCAA);
Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016)
(holding student-athletes were not employees).
45 SMITH, supra note 1, at 53–54.
46 Id. at 54.
47 Testimony of Defendants’ Witness, Mark Emmert at 1775-1780,
O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
No. C-09-3329.
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without compensation because they are, first and foremost, students,
and thus could not receive any monetary benefits beyond athletic
scholarships, room and board, and financial aid.48
But amateurism was not a home grown American ideal.49
Rather, amateurism began as a mythical badge of honor dreamt up
by “snooty British elites who enjoyed rowing, winning, and keeping
the unwashed, day-laboring masses at arm’s length.”50 Olympic
historian, Bill Mallon, describes British fabrication of Greek
amateurism:
Amateurism really started when the people who were
rowing boats on the Thames for a living started
beating all the rich British aristocrats. . . . That
wasn’t right. So they started a concept of amateurism
that didn’t exist in ancient Greece, extending it more
and more to the notion of being a gentleman,
someone who didn’t work for a living and only did
sport as a hobby.51
The NCAA’s amateurism model has generated a great deal of
discourse since its inception.52 One of the earliest problems was
derived from summer baseball leagues.53 In the 1880s, summer
vacation resorts incorporated the “Great American Game” of
baseball into the resorts’ amenity packages.54 Seeking summer
employment, college baseball players often entered into
arrangements with these resorts, receiving room, board, and a
meager allowance to play baseball (among other responsibilities).55
College teams noticed this trend and levied student athletes’
participation in resort baseball as challenges to rival schools’ stars’
eligibility.56 As bluntly stated by Francis A. March of Lafayette
48 See id. at 76-77 (Mark Emmert testified that student-athletes are not
supposed to receive benefits outside of scholarships, room and board, and
financial aid).
49 SMITH, supra note 1, at 57.
50 Hruby, supra note 31.
51 Id.
52 SMITH, supra note 1, at 52.
53 Id. at 54.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 55.
56 Id.
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College, using summer baseball as leverage for student-athlete
disqualification was a shameful “bit of snobbishness from across the
water, and totally opposed to the American theory of equality.”57
Such a sentiment echoes the NCAA’s initial struggle to enforce
amateurism.
Throughout the early 1900s, the NCAA’s definition of
amateurism evolved. Originally, collegiate athletes were not
supposed to receive compensation in any form, including
scholarships.58 However, for almost the first fifty years of its
existence, the NCAA could not directly regulate the schools’ athletic
programs.59 The NCAA’s lack of power allowed individual
collegiate athletic conferences to police amateurism themselves
until the 1929 Carnegie Report on American College Athletics
condemned the practice of intertwining the goals of college athletics
and higher education.60 F.W. Marvel, the physical director at Brown
University, explained what the paradoxical relation between
universities and student-athletes meant: “[Universities] must
conduct our sports and play along amateur lines, but we must
finance them along lines that are purely commercial and
professional.”61 In 1939, the NCAA codified amateurism into their
constitution but still did not have the financial backing necessary to
enforce the code.62 Finally, in 1948, the NCAA enacted the Sanity
Code, thereby gaining the power to enforce the amateurism
requirement.63 However, the enactment did not bar any
compensation whatsoever; instead, it allowed for student-athletes to
receive funds for tuition and other fees.64 Some contended these
benefits undermined the original interpretation of amateurism,
foreshadowing the modern lack of expansion of benefits for student-
athletes.65 Currently, approved academic funding and a $2,000
57 Id. at 58.
58 Afshar, supra note 3, at 109.
59 SMITH, supra note 1, at 53.
60 Id. at 60.
61 Id. at 61.
62 Id. at 90–91.
63 Id. at 95–96.
64 Id. at 96.
65 Id.
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stipend for living costs are the only acceptable benefits a collegiate
athlete may receive.66
Although NCAA-compliant benefits remained consistent over
the years, powerful and wealthy individuals began to illicitly
compensate student-athletes.67 High-profile collegiate athletes are
constantly tempted with improper benefits from alumni, boosters,
and agents.68 These “overzealous alums” are the reason many
players get caught in “opportunistic entanglement[s],” with the
consequences ultimately borne by the athletes.69 Penalties for
accepting improper benefits can range from the violating player
being ruled ineligible—adversely impacting their future
professional status70—to forced charitable donations of thousands
of dollars.71 Further, violations of the amateurism rule are
questionable, as players have been penalized for merely attending
sponsored parties in Miami,72 or not disclosing friendly
relationships with professional players.73 In response, some legal
scholars took the position that allowing student-athletes to accept
66 Afshar, supra note 3, at 109.
67 Michael A. Corgan, Permitting Student-Athletes to Accept Endorsement
Deals: A Solution to the Financial Corruption of College Athletics Created by
Unethical Sports Agents and the NCAA’s Revenue-Generating Scheme, 19 VILL.
SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 371, 398–99 (2012).
68 Afshar, supra note 3, at 109.
69 Shropshire, supra note 10, at 48.
70 See Dan Van Wie, The 25 Most Unexpected Free Falls in NFL Draft
History, BLEACHER REP. (Apr. 24, 2012), https://bleacherreport.com/articles
/1152908-the-25-most-unexpected-free-falls-in-nfl-draft-history (explaining that
former college football players Andre Smith and Marvin Austin fell in their
respective NFL drafts due to questions about their maturity because they were
suspended for accepting improper benefits in college).
71 Bailey Brautigan, Cam Newton and 10 College Athletes in Scandal: Is It
Their Fault or the System?, BLEACHER REP. (Nov. 10, 2010), https://
bleacherreport.com/articles/514177-10-college-athletes-involved-in-scandals-is-
it-their-fault-or-the-system (explaining that after attending an “agent-sponsored”
party in Miami, Alabama defensive lineman Marcell Dareus was ruled ineligible
for two games and forced to donate $1,787 to charity before returning from
suspension).
72 Id.
73 Id. (explaining that former Oklahoma State receiver Dez Bryant was ruled
ineligible for part of the 2009 season for failing to disclose a mentor-mentee
relationship with Deion Sanders).
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endorsements might curb the rampant temptations created by
professional sports agents teasing improper benefits to entice
student-athletes into future representation agreements.74
Regardless of the inconsistent application of its amateurism rule,
the NCAA argues this model drives the appeal of college sports in
comparison to other developmental leagues.75 Specifically, it
compares its fan base to minor league sports, concluding that, as a
result of embracing amateurism, it dominates the developmental
sports fan base.76 It bases this conclusion largely on the sense of
community that it contends is fostered when fans are watching and
cheering for players who are competing, ostensibly, for school
pride.77 Further, students and universities benefit from the amateur
model because it creates a wide latitude of options corresponding to
the numerous factors that go into making a choice to attend a certain
university.78 Large programs can offer students prestigious
education, higher chances of making professional sports teams and
the opportunity to compete for national championships.79
Conversely, small programs can lure students with tight knit
communities, offer less-highly recruited athletes starting positions,
and promise scholarships a larger school might not offer.80
Champions of amateurism wholly embrace the community
aspect of college sports, while their critics have taken every
opportunity to lambast and mock these sentiments:
Carolina president Harris Pastides said that paying
players would create a “wedge” between them and
their classmates, and make uncompensated, non-
revenue-sport athletes feel ‘worse about themselves.’
NCAA president Mark Emmert, meanwhile, fretted
74 Corgan, supra note 67, at 415.
75 Testimony of Defendants’ Witness, Mark Emmert at 1769, O’Bannon v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014) No. C-09-
3329 (opining that developmental leagues are less successful than the NCAA due
to amateurism).
76 See id. (opining that minor league sports are not particularly successful).
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that if an “athlete was being paid and it changed
significantly their lifestyle, they probably would not
be living in a residence hall. They probably would
not be eating in the cafeteria, they probably would
not be as—as active a member or participant in the
life of a campus.” [The Author’s retort:]
Translation? If we pay them, they won’t hang out on
the quad. The. Horror.81
These critics’ skepticism and cynicism has not changed since the
NCAA announcement.82
Because of the NCAA’s long held desire to keep players at full-
amateur status, it is likely any change with respect to a player’s
ability to market their name and likeness will be heavily restricted.83
Some college sports analysts have even expressed their belief that
the NCAA’s ruling is purely an attempt to “stall,” seeing it as very
unlikely that it will be willing to abandon a principle that it has
continuously asserted is vital to its model.84 Even at this stage, the
NCAA itself has tempered expectations, explaining any rule change
will still be “in a manner consistent with the collegiate model.”85
Thus, many skeptically believe that it will merely issue “severely
limited and regulated (changes) with very little consequence and
81 Patrick Hruby, Amateurism Isn’t Educational: Debunking the NCAA’s
Dumbest Lie, VICE (June 14, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us
/article/kzqevz/amateurism-isnt-educational-debunking-the-ncaas-dumbest-lie.
82 David K. Li, NCAA Takes Steps to Allow College Athletes to Cash In on
Their Fame, NBC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2019, 2:21 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/news/us-news/ncaa-takes-steps-allow-student-athletes-cash-their-fame-
n1073436.
83 Will Hobson, NCAA Softens on Allowing College Athletes to Be Paid, but




84 E.g., Scott Gleeson, Jay Bilas Calls the NCAA’s Proposal to Pay Athletes
a Bluff: It’s ‘Frankly Embarrassing’, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com
/story/sports/ncaab/2019/10/31/jay-bilas-ncaa-proposal-name-image-
likeness/4108076002/ (last updated Nov. 1, 2019, 2:05 PM) (noting that former
Duke basketball player Jay Bilas has vocalized his skepticism on the NCAA’s
recent proposal); Murphy, supra note 32.
85 Gleeson, supra note 84.
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benefit to the players.”86 Essentially, the media expectation is that
the NCAAwill sluggishly move toward conservative rule changes.87
Regardless of its disposition, 38 of the 400 pages of the NCAA
Division I manual is devoted to keeping money from student-
athletes.88 Thus, the NCAA is likely in no rush to make new rule
changes, as it will require a complete overhaul of its extremely
profitable system.
II. THE OLYMPIC MOVE FROM STRICT AMATEURISM
A. Early History of Olympic Amateurism
The ancient Greek Olympian is often fallaciously alluded to as
the gold standard of amateurism.89 The Olympics arose over a time
where the athlete purely participated in “sports for the
glory . . . alone.”90 As noted above, there is “no mention of
amateurism in Greek sources, no reference to amateur athletes [and]
no evidence that the concept of amateurism was even known in
antiquity.”91 “The truth is that ‘amateur’ is one thing for which the
ancient Greeks never had a word.”92 Regardless, the modern
Olympics has moved on from the fabled tradition of amateurism.93
Original rules for global sporting competitions like the Henley
Regatta94 required, “no person shall be considered an amateur
oarsman or sculler . . . who is or has been by trade or employment
86 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
87 Li, supra note 82.
88 MURPHY, supra note 32, at 4.




93 See Teddy Nykiel, 2018 US Olympians Open up About Money Struggles,
CNBC (Feb. 15, 2018, 3:05 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/15/2018-us-
olympians-open-up-about-money-struggles.html (detailing how lower tier
Olympic athletes receive compensation).
94 Peter Scott, 2021 Royal Canadian Henley Regatta, ROYAL CANADIAN
HENLEYREGATTA (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.henleyregatta.ca/ (explaining that
the Henley Regatta is a world-renowned crew rowing competition).
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for wages a mechanic, artisan, or laborer.”95 However, the 1892
Olympic Congress believed such a rule unfairly prejudiced
individuals who “made [their] living by [their] hands.”96
Accordingly, the Olympic Congress relaxed its ban on
employment.97
Amateurism quickly began to deteriorate in the 1900s, marked
by the disgrace of iconic Olympic athletes.98 In 1912, Jim Thorpe
placed first in the Olympic pentathlon99 by winning four of five
events, thus earning the first Olympic decathlon100 by winning four
of ten events, all while wearing mismatched shoes.101 No Olympian
has achieved a similar feat since, arguably making him the “greatest
athlete of all time.”102 However, the International Olympic
Committee (“IOC”) stripped him of all medals and records after
learning he had participated in the 1909–1910 professional minor
league baseball season, thereby dismantling his amateur status.103
The major ideological turning point was the IOC’s refusal to
distinguish between the economic structures of Eastern andWestern
95 L.A. Jennings, For Love or for Money: A History of Amateurism in the





98 Sally Jenkins, Why Are Jim Thorpe’s Olympic Records Still not
Recognized?, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (July 2012), https://
www.smithsonianmag.com/history/why-are-jim-thorpes-olympic-records-still-
not-recognized-130986336/.
99 The modern Olympic pentathlon consists of fencing, freestyle swimming,
equestrian show jumping, and a final combined event of cross country running
and pistol shooting. Modern Pentathlon, OLYMPICS, https://www.olympic.org
/modern-pentathlon (last visited Jan. 2, 2021).
100 The modern Olympic decathlon consists of 100-meter dash, long jump,
shot put, high jump, 400-meter dash, 110-meter hurdles, discus throw, pole vault,
javelin throw, and 1500-meter dash. Decathlon, WORLD ATHLETICS, https://
www.worldathletics.org/disciplines/combined-events/decathlon (last visited Feb.
12, 2021).
101 Jenkins, supra note 98.
102 Id.
103 Id.
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Hemisphere sports.104 The western nations built private leagues
whose players the IOC barred due to the Olympic amateurism
requirement.105 Meanwhile, eastern nations’ sports were “state
sponsored,” allowing their players to preserve amateur status,
despite nations covering athletes’ expenses.106 In 1985, the IOC
finally realized that state-sponsorship simply disguised Eastern
Hemisphere athletes’ ability to receive compensation, and relented
by allowing its first professional athletes to compete in tennis, ice
hockey and soccer, so long as the player was under age twenty-
three.107 Further, in 1988, it adapted its model of amateurism to
allow individual nations to award their medaling athletes monetary
bonuses.108 Due to the complexities of international sporting rules
and individual agreements with the IOC, professionals were allowed
to compete on a sport-by-sport basis (with the most recent sport
integrating to the new rule being boxing in 2016).109 This left
wrestling as the last amateur-only Olympic sport.110
B. The Current Olympic Model of Amateurism
Olympic athletes are by no means directly paid for their
participation, evidencing a malleable model of amateurism.111 The
IOC does not directly pay athletes a dime; rather, Olympians can
104 See Frank Litsky, I.O.C. Expected to Ease Amateur Policy, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 30, 1986), https://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/30/sports/ioc-expected-to-
ease-amateur-policy.html (detailing that the I.O.C. decided to ease its amateurism
policy).
105 See id. (stating that the I.O.C. initially did not allow professional athletes,
the majority of which played in the western hemisphere, to compete in the
Olympics).
106 Id.
107 Robert Mcg. Thomas Jr., Olympics to Allow Pros in 3 Sports, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 1, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/03/01/sports/olympics-to-allow-
pros-in-3-sports.html.
108 Jennings, supra note 95; see Nykiel, supra note 93 (reporting that at the
2018 Olympic games, U.S. athletes will earn $37,500 for each gold medal,
$22,500 for each silver, and $15,000 for each bronze).
109 Jennings, supra note 95.
110 Id.
111 See Nykiel, supra note 93 (detailing how Olympians who did not receive
compensation for medaling earn money).
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win prize money from their local Olympic Committees.112 In fact,
many athletes crowd source their funding or rely on sponsorships.113
Further, these sponsorships are available to athletes who do not
medal.114 Although athletes have admitted they wish they could
focus purely on the perfection of their sport and less on the monetary
aspect, the fact remains that without this funding, they would be less
equipped to pursue their passion.115
III. THE PARAMETERS OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION OVER STUDENT-ATHLETES’ NAMES AND
LIKENESSES
Regardless of scholarly debate over amateurism, student-
athletes themselves have made numerous attempts to recover the
profits they believe college athletics has improperly reaped from
their talents. The campaign to vindicate student-athletes’ rights
through litigation began with lawsuits against the NCAA for the
improper use of players’ names and likenesses in video games.116
A. Student-Athletes’ Names and Likenesses Are Protected
Against Commercial Use in Videogames
In 2008, Ed O’Bannon visited a friend whose son recognized the
UCLA All American basketball player from the video game NCAA
Basketball, a game developed by Electronic Arts (“EA”). O’Bannon
noticed that the player avatar not only resembled him, but shared his
jersey number as well.117 Around the same time, former Arizona
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Id. (reporting that non-medaling Olympians often can still command
significant endorsement dollars from local or specialized brands).
115 Id.
116 See, e.g., O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049
(9th Cir. 2015) (student-athletes brought class action anti-trust suit against NCAA
for profiting off video game which exploited players’ names and likenesses); In
re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th
Cir. 2013) (student-athletes brought suit against EA Sports for producing video
game franchise which exploited players’ names and likenesses).
117 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
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State University and University of Nebraska quarterback, Sam
Keller, also discovered that EA had copied his name and likeness
into the popular game NCAA Football.118 Both players, like many
other NCAA athletes, never consented for their likeness to be used,
nor did either ever have the opportunity to share in the profits EA
and the NCAA secured by sales of the games.119 Naturally, the
athletes contended the NCAA and EA’s agreement to exploit
players’ names and likenesses was unlawful.120
In O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Association and
Keller v. Electronic Arts, Inc., Ed O’Bannon and Sam Keller
separately sued the NCAA and EA for each entity’s role in their
licensing agreement.121 Although the student-athletes initiated each
action separately, the California district court eventually
consolidated O’Bannon and Keller during pretrial proceedings and
certified the consolidation action as a class action dubbed In re
NCAA Student Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig.122 The
Ninth Circuit decided Mr. Keller’s right of publicity claims in In re
NCAA, and then, after deconsolidating the actions, decided Mr.
O’Bannon’s anti-trust claims in O’Bannon.123
i. Mr. Keller’s Right of Publicity Claims
Prior to consolidation, the district court had already denied EA’s
motion to dismiss the right of publicity claims.124 Post
118 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d
at 1267–68.
119 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055; In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name &
Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1267–68.
120 See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (noting that the “gravamen of
[O’Bannon’s] complaint was . . . the NCAA’s amateurism rules”).
121 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055, 1067 (noting that the student-athletes
alleged antitrust violations under the Sherman Act because the NCAA “foreclosed
the market” for their names, images, and likeness in videogames); In re NCAA
Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1271.
122 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d
at 1271.
123 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1056–57.
124 California’s anti-SNAPP statute reads:
[A] cause of action against a person arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
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consolidation, EA appealed to the Ninth Circuit asserting the district
court should have ruled, as a matter of law, that California’s anti-
SNAPP statute125—meant to amplify First Amendment affirmative
defenses against right of publicity claims—barred the student-
athletes’ right of publicity claims.126 Upholding the district court
ruling, the Ninth Circuit held none of the asserted affirmative
defenses, including the transformative use defense,127 barred the
plaintiffs from prevailing on the merits.128
The Ninth Circuit rooted its holding in the Third Circuit’s
reasoning in Hart v. Electronic Arts.129 In Hart, the Third Circuit
similarly rejected EA’s argument that it had satisfied the
transformative use test by creating virtual avatars modeled after
student-athletes, because EA’s video game NCAA Football
intentionally depicted realistic representations of the players.130
Thus, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow EA to “escape liability” for
exploiting a student-athlete’s likeness simply by virtue of using a
virtual avatar, and denied EA First Amendment protection.131 It
reasoned that much of the value in NCAA Football concerned the
realistic depictions of the players, and thus it was the player’s
likeness—not the avatar EA created—that drove the commercial
success of the franchise.132
speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject
to a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the
plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d at 1272.
125 Id. at 1267–68.
126 Id. at 1278–79.
127 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055. The transformative use test is a “balancing
test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether the
work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed into
something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation.” Id.
128 In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d
at 1267–68.
129 See id. at 1278–81 (discussing theHart holding at length, which the Third
Circuit had decided just months before).
130 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 168 (3d Cir. 2013).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 169.
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ii. The O’Bannon Anti-Trust Claims
Post-deconsolidation of In re NCAA, the district court conducted
a bench trial on the anti-trust claims alleged in O’Bannon. There, the
court concluded that, under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, “the
NCAA’s rules have an anticompetitive effect on the college
education market.”133 The court also rejected the NCAA’s
contention that “it had a ‘longstanding commitment to
amateurism;’” rather, finding the NCAA’s definition of amateurism
to be “‘malleable,’ changing frequently over time in ‘significant and
contradictory ways.’”134 Ultimately, the district court agreed that the
plaintiffs had stated two “less restrictive alternatives” to NCAA
rules preventing EA from compensating the student-athletes for
licensing rights:
(1) allowing schools to award stipends to student-
athletes up to the full cost of attendance, thereby
making up for any ‘shortfall’ in their grants-in-aid;
and (2) permitting schools to hold a portion of their
licensing revenues in trust, to be distributed to
student-athletes in equal shares after they leave
college.135
While embracing these possibilities, the court denied the plaintiffs’
proposal to allow student-athletes to be compensated by “school-
approved endorsements.”136 Following this determination, it issued
an injunction against the NCAA and ordered them to permit “up to
$5,000 in deferred compensation” for the players’ names, images,
and likenesses, holding the funds in trust until they leave school.137
133 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th
Cir. 2015) (“Were it not for [amateurism] rules, the court explained, schools
would compete with each other by offering recruits compensation exceeding the
cost of attendance, which would effectively lower the price that the recruits must
pay for the combination of education and athletic opportunities that the schools
provide.”).
134 Id. at 1058.
135 Id. at 1060–61.
136 Id. at 1084 n.8.
137 Id. at 1061.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
rationale that the NCAA was “subject to anti-trust scrutiny.”138
However, it reversed the lower court’s order to permit schools to
compensate the student-athletes up to $5,000 upon leaving
school,139 writing:
The difference between offering student-athletes
education-related compensation and offering them
cash sums untethered to educational expenses is not
minor; it is a quantum leap. Once that line is crossed,
we see no basis for returning to a rule of amateurism
and no defined stopping point. . . . At that point the
NCAA will have surrendered its amateurism
principles entirely and transitioned from its
‘particular brand of football’ to minor league
status.140
Thus, the Ninth Circuit agreed the NCAA had been overly
restrictive in its compensation policy, but nonetheless refused to
order payment above cost of attendance to avoid violating the
sanctity of amateurism.141 In the end, the NCAA settled with the
athletes to avoid continued litigation over the anti-trust claim.142
The Ninth Circuit’s position on EA’s intentional
misappropriation of these student-athletes’ individual names and
likenesses is perhaps best summarized by the District Court’s
opinion: “It seems ludicrous to question whether video game
consumers enjoy and, as a result, purchase more EA-produced video
games as a result of the heightened realism associated with actual
players.”143 Notwithstanding that sentiment, and in an unwavering
138 Id. at 1079.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 1078–79.
141 Id. at 1079.
142 See Ben Estes, Judge Gives Preliminary Approval for Settlement in Video
Game Case, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 25, 2014), https://www.si.com/college-
football/2014/07/25/judge-claudia-wilken-approves-60-million-settlement-
video-game-case (explaining that Electronic Arts settled their portion of the
lawsuit for $40million and that the NCAA followed suit, agreeing to a $20million
settlement one year after).
143 Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 783 (D.N.J. 2011).
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commitment to amateurism, the court was still unwilling to order the
NCAA or the universities to directly pay players for such uses.144
B. Students Athletes’ Names and Likenesses are Not
Protected Against Use in Fantasy Sports
Although the O’Bannon ruling helped protect student-athletes’
names and likeness from exploitation, they soon suffered a setback
in Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc.145 FanDuel and its defendant
counterparts are daily fantasy sports websites where players (any
user who logs onto the website and makes a wager) enter
competitions with other players to draft a statistically optimal team
of college athletes for a given period of time.146 Players whose teams
perform the best over the time period receive monetary payouts.147
Daily fantasy sports players buy into certain fantasy pools, from
which they are allocated a set amount of online currency.148 Players
then attempt to win the entire pool by most efficiently allocating
their online currency among players with the highest individual
statistical successes in the given sport.149
The plaintiffs in FanDuelwere collegiate student-athletes whose
individual statistics were published by the defendants for the
144 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1079 (9th
Cir. 2015).
145 See generally Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-01230-TWP-DKL,
2017 WL 4340329 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017) (holding that statutory exceptions
shield defendants from liability under Indiana’s right-of-publicity statute).
146 Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d 390, 392 (Ind. 2018).
147 See Rules & Scoring, DRAFTKINGS DAILY FANTASY, https://
www.draftkings.com/help/rules/1/1 (last visited Nov. 22, 2020) (explaining
different available sports, games, and rules).
148 See id. (listing different types of pools to buy into and the associated
rules).
149 For example, Player A buys into the Saturday College Football pool for
$10, where the first prize in the pool is $10,000, so Player A would, like all other
players who buy into the pool, get 100 “fantasy” dollars with which they can
“buy” certain players, who are all assigned values based on their projected
individual statistical success. In essence, Player A is attempting to allocate the
100 fantasy dollars amongst players who will have the best individual success
among all others in the given pool. For further explanation, See id. (discussing
daily fantasy rules).
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purposes of providing their daily fantasy service to their users.150
This allowed paying consumers to access “detailed information such
as Plaintiffs’ names, images, and statistics, assess the athletes’
weekly performances, and assemble a virtual team of real-life
athletes.”151 Thus, like the O’Bannon line of cases, the plaintiffs in
FanDuel argued the defendants’ public exploitation of this
information for profit constituted an improper use of their names and
likeness.
The plaintiffs in FanDuel relied on Indiana’s Right of Publicity
statute which bars a person from using “an aspect of a personality’s
right of publicity for commercial purpose during the personality’s
lifetime.”152 The Southern District of Indiana dismissed the case,
relying on the statute’s “newsworthiness” exception, which
excludes “the use of a personality’s name, . . . image, [and] likeness
in material that has political or newsworthy value,”153 and the public
interest exception, which excludes the use of a person’s right to
publicity “in connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event
or a topic of general or public interest.”154 The Court used the same
rationale to fulfill each exception, distinguishing these websites
from the videogame avatars in In re NCAA155 by holding the
defendants’ sites “provide factual data, and their websites could be
used as ‘reference sources,’ either for purposes of playing the
associated [daily fantasy] game, or for information about the
collegiate sports and athletes.”156 Though the plaintiffs attempted to
characterize the defendants’ site as an illegal gambling operation,
which they argued would preclude the defendants from utilizing any
of the statutory exceptions, the court declined to make a ruling on
this issue, determining the legality of the conduct would not affect
the statutory exemptions.157
150 FanDuel, Inc., 109 N.E.3d at 392.
151 Id.
152 Daniels v. FanDuel, Inc., No. 1:16-CV-01230-TWP-DKL, 2017 WL
4340329, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2017).
153 Id. at *3, *7.
154 Id.
155 In reNCAA Student-Athlete Name& Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d
1268, 1280 (9th Cir. 2013).
156 FanDuel, Inc., 2017 WL 4340329, at *9.
157 Id. at *10.
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The plaintiffs appealed on grounds that the defendants’ entire
operation of daily fantasy games was a criminal enterprise akin to
illegal gambling,158 again arguing that the “newsworthy value”
exception should not apply to criminal activity.159 The Seventh
Circuit rejected the argument and affirmed, reiterating the district
court’s opinion that the Indiana Supreme Court “could have
articulated [an illegality] exception” to the “newsworthy value” and
“public interest” exceptions and did not.160 Refusing to reinterpret
Indiana law, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court ruling that
the use of a player’s photo and statistics in daily fantasy pools is
exempt from a student-athletes’ right of publicity.161
IV. STUDENT-ATHLETES ARE NOT EMPLOYEES UNDER THE FAIR
LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Appellate courts have regularly upheld dismissals of student-
athletes’ actions against their former universities and the NCAA
where they alleged their relationship with the two was that of an
employee and employer.162 In Berger v. NCAA, the Seventh Circuit
upheld a lower court ruling dismissing the former University of
Pennsylvania women’s track and field athletes’ complaint against
the university and the NCAA for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”).163 The Seventh Circuit first found that,
under the FLSA, the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue the NCAA or
universities other than the University of Pennsylvania, because their
relationships to those entities were “far too tenuous to be considered
an employment relationship.”164 The court then evaluated the FLSA




162 See, e.g., Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285 (7th Cir.
2016) (dismissing FLSA claim, holding plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit as
they were not employees of the NCAA or their university); Dawson v. Nat’l
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019) (dismissing class action
under the FLSA and California Labor Code because the student-athletes were not
employees).
163 Berger, 843 F.3d at 288.
164 Id. at 289.
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claim against the university itself, holding that in light of the
economic reality of the working relationship,165 it could not be
considered an employer of the players due to the “revered tradition
of amateurism in college sports.”166 Although it might have, the
court declined to apply a “multi-factor” economic reality test
because it “failed to capture the true nature of the relationship”
between student-athletes and the university.167 Rather, the court
opted for a “flexible” totality of the circumstances approach to the
economic realities test, emphasizing that amateurism “define[s] the
economic reality of the relationship between the student-athletes and
their schools.”168 Overall, the court concluded, amateurism prevents
student-athletes from being considered employees under the
FLSA.169
Similarly, in Dawson v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association, the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of a class action
complaint made by former student-athletes, because, as it found,
they were not employees—under the FLSA or California Labor
Code—of the NCAA, the Pacific Athletic Conference Twelve
(“PAC-12”), or their former universities.170 Unlike Berger,
however, the Dawson Court did apply the multi-factor economic
reality test to determine whether an employer-employee relationship
existed.171 Agreeing with the lower court’s ruling, the Ninth Circuit
found that the plaintiffs did not satisfy the factors of the multi-factor
test because the NCAA and PAC-12 were “regulatory bodies, not
employers of student-athletes under the FLSA.”172 As it reasoned,
165 Id. at 290 (“[T]he test for employment under the FLSA is one of
‘economic reality’ . . . which accounts for the circumstances of the whole activity
rather than considering isolated factors.”).
166 Id. at 291 (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents, 468
U.S. 85, 120 (1984)).
167 Id. (quoting Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992)).
168 Id.
169 Id. at 294.
170 Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 913–14 (9th
Cir. 2019).
171 See id. (“[C]ircumstances relevant in evaluating economic
reality . . . includ[e]: (1) expectation of compensation, (2) the power to hire and
fire, (3) and evidence that an arrangement was ‘conceived or carried out to evade
the law.’”) (internal citations omitted).
172 See id. at 911.
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the schools these entities regulated were not “in the business of
playing football and basketball,” and the students were not “hired
by the school to compete in interscholastic competition.”173
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit found the plaintiffs were not
employees of their respective universities under California Labor
Law because California courts had consistently held otherwise.174 It
justified its reliance on these prior holdings by pointing out that
California’s legislature had refused to classify student-athletes as
employees, even where athletes received scholarships.175
The takeaway from Berger and Dawson is that, seemingly under
whichever economic reality test might be used to determine the
existence of an employer-employee relationship, courts still
summarily refuse to extend FLSA employee protections to student-
athletes.176 Of course, the Dawson dismissal was particularly
crushing for student-athletes as it derived from the multi-factor
test177—the plaintiffs’ preference in Berger under which that court
refused to conduct its analysis.178 Thus, even under plaintiffs’ most
favorable interpretation of the economic reality test, courts are
seemingly unwilling to extend them the protections granted to
employees under the FLSA.
173 Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 250 F. Supp. 3d 401, 408
(N.D. Cal. 2017).
174 See Dawson, 932 F.3d at 912–13 (detailing California appellate court
decisions that have held that (1) student-athletes are not employees of their
respective universities, and thus those universities are not liable for torts
committed by student-athletes during competitions, and (2) that student-athletes,
not being employees of their respective universities, cannot state claims for
violations of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act).
175 Id. at 913. California’s Education Code acknowledges students spend
almost “40 hours per week participating in their respective sports” and “generate
large revenues,” but that “[i]nstead of extending employment-related protections
to student-athletes,” California’s legislature upheld the status quo of “scholarship
compensation,” “life skill workshops,” university payment of student insurance
deductibles, “medical expenses for injured students,” and “due process
protections for student-athletes involved in disciplinary actions . . . .” Id.
176 Id. at 912–13; Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285,
290 (7th Cir. 2016).
177 See Dawson, 932 F.3d at 910–11 (applying the multi-factor test).
178 Berger, 843 F.3d at 291.
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V. CURRENT LEGISLATION EXPANDS BEYOND STUDENTS
PROFITING OFF OF THEIR NAMES AND LIKENESSES
College athletic programs now find themselves at a similar
crossroads as the Olympics found itself in the mid-1980s; NCAA
officials have been forced to allow students to profit in some way
off of their name and likeness.179 Thus, the issue is not a matter of
whether amateurism will be eliminated, but rather, to what degree
its principles should survive when determining the manner in which
college athletes will receive compensation.180 Currently, California
and New York have proposed or enacted statutes which provide
student-athletes the right to profit off their name and likeness.181
However, both statutes maintain unique caveats to a player’s ability
to profit. California’s statute provides that a player’s endorsement
cannot conflict with any pre-existing university endorsement.182
New York’s proposed bill mandates athletes receive fifteen percent
of revenue generated from ticket sales and that schools set up a fund
for permanently injured athletes.183 Both of these provisions indicate
distinct and troubling deviations from warnings within the
O’Bannon and Berger line of judicial opinions.184
A. New York’s Bill Mandates Schools Pay a Percentage of
Their Sponsorship Deals to Students—Indicating a Shift
to a Problematic Privatized Model
New York’s bill builds on the rulings in Berger and O’Bannon
in a manner that greatly expands a player’s right to compensation.
179 Almasy et al., supra note 37.
180 Id.
181 S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); S.B. 6722B, 2019–
2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
182 Cal. S.B. 206.
183 N.Y. S.B. 6722B §§ 6438-a(7), (8).
184 See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053
(9th Cir. 2015) (refusing to allow the student-athletes to receive direct payments
for their involvement in college sports out of concern that the line between
privatized athletics and college sports would no longer exist); Berger, 843 F.3d at
293.
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This is because it mandates direct payments of a percentage of ticket
sales to student-athletes:
8. At the conclusion of each school year, each college
shall take fifteen percent of the revenue earned from
ticket sales to all athletic events and divide and pay
such amount to all student-athletes.185
New York’s bill is a gratuitous enlargement of the O’Bannon
holding. Under O’Bannon, the court simply confirmed that third-
parties could not unilaterally license use of players’ names and
likenesses.186 Further, it refused to acknowledge whether the NCAA
had acted improperly by denying the players the right to profit off
of their image while maintaining the status of a college athlete.187
Thus, even though the O’Bannon court held the NCAA wrongfully
exploited the player’s name and likenesses, it refused to allow
student-athletes to receive direct payments in addition to the cost of
attendance.188
By mandating that universities directly pay athletes a
predetermined portion of ticket sales, New York’s bill also goes
beyond the Olympic athlete compensation model. Neither the
International Olympic Committee nor individual nations directly
pay Olympians a guaranteed portion of revenues.189 Olympians only
receive money in relationship to their athletic achievements through
endorsement deals, cost of living stipends from their nation’s teams,
and by winning medal bonuses paid out by their respective national
committees.190 By contrast, New York’s direct compensation
provision is the sort of guaranteed payment one might expect in
professional sports, where players have contracts guaranteeing their
salary.191 In this way, the New York bill resembles a shift past the
185 N.Y. S.B. 6722B § 6438-a(8).
186 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1067–69.
187 See id. at 1077–78.
188 Id. at 1079.
189 See Nykiel, supra note 93 (detailing the ways Olympians earn money,
none of which are directly tied to revenue).
190 See id. (explaining that Olympians can only receive stipends or bonuses
for their performance, which are not directly tied to revenue).
191 Compare S.B. 6722B, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6438-a(8) (N.Y.
2019) (requiring the payment of a percentage of ticket sale revenues to all student-
athletes at the end of each year), with Mike Jones, Kirk Cousins Officially Signs
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Olympic amateurismmodel and towards privatized professionalized
developmental sports.
The New York bill puts the universities in the position of de
facto employer.192 Indeed, the only difference between the New
York bill and the professional model is that players are paid a
guaranteed portion of revenues rather than a pre-determined
salary.193 Such a payment structure is unheard of in professional
sports, where the highest valued contracts are guaranteed only for
salary.194 Incredibly, the direct payment of revenues under the New
York bill suggests that student-athletes could earn a commission off
their school’s athletic programs. No matter the interpretation of such
a payment structure, an employee relationship clearly departs from
Dawson and Berger, implicating a shift to privatization.195
It should be noted that some scholars have advocated for a
completely privatized NCAA model196—allowing full
compensation for players in line with professional sports. However,
such a solution is definitively a far departure from the NCAA’s
desire to keep college sports in line with the current amateurism
model.197 Princeton University’s Professor Andrew Zimbalist
proposed an example of a completely privatized college sports
model:
The University of Michigan Wolverines could still
be the Michigan Wolverines and play their games in
Ann Arbor, but the football players would have no
necessary connection to the university. Rather, the
Three-Year, $84 Million Deal with Minnesota Vikings, USA TODAY (Mar. 15,
2018, 3:23 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/vikings/2018/03/15
/kirk-cousins-officially-signs-minnesota-vikings/419918002/ (explaining that
professional football player Kirk Cousins recently signed a contract guaranteeing
his $84 million salary).
192 SeeN.Y. S.B. 6722B § 6438-a(8) (guaranteeing players a portion of ticket
revenues).
193 Id.
194 Jones, supra note 191 (explaining that Kirk Cousins signed the first fully
guaranteed deal at top of the market value).
195 See Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir.
2016); Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905, 912 (9th Cir.
2019).
196 ZIMBALIST, supra note 23, at 200.
197 Gleeson, supra note 84.
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team, with subsidies from the pros, would be a
separate business entity. It would rent the stadium or
arena from the university and some of its players
might be part-time students. But all its players would
be paid as minor league football or basketball
players. The Michigan students could still root for
their local team, the way they might root for the
Detroit Lions or Pistons. Only now the team would
be playing on their campus and the connection would
be closer. Michigan boosters should be just as happy
either way. If the schools that run perennially
profitable football or basketball teams resist such a
change, then they might be offered the option of
owning the team as a separate entity. In any event,
the school can earn money by renting and operating
the stadium, retaining student athletic fees, or
providing room and board for the players.198
The current NCAA model sets up students for greater financial
success than privatized development leagues. Advocates of
privatization might contend paying their players a salary would help
fairly allocate revenue, but such salaries are meager compared to the
value of an athletic scholarship. The MLB has endured intense
scrutiny of their underpayment of developmental players, recently
“raising” their minimum payment of players to merely meet the
minimum wage.199 Meanwhile, the NBA’s developmental “G-
League” recently upgraded its player contracts to $35,000 per
year.200 The most lucrative minor league salaries, found in AHL
hockey, begin at $47,500 per year.201 In contrast, NCAA teams offer
competitive athletic scholarships—including room and board. At
Dayton University, for any student-athlete, such a scholarship can
198 ZIMBALIST, supra note 23, at 199–200.
199 Michael Baumann, The Disgrace of Minor League Baseball, THERINGER
(Apr. 20, 2018, 5:50 AM), https://www.theringer.com/mlb/2018/4/20/17259846
/minor-league-baseball-anti-labor-ronald-acuna-scott-kingery (explaining that
minor league baseball players were projected to earn $1,160 per month, on
workweeks spanning between 50-70 hours).
200 Id.
201 Id.
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be worth close to $55,000 per year for tuition and housing.202 These
scholarships also provide the intangible opportunity for
advancement outside of athletics, as NCAA student-athletes boast a
rising 87% graduation rate.203 In contrast, private development
league players barely make minimum-wage and work extremely
long hours, all with little guarantee they will make it to the pros.204
Privatized development leagues may also interfere with young
players’ ability to achieve scholarly enrichment. For example, some
blame the bifurcated private/collegiate developmental system in
professional baseball for the fact that NCAA baseball scholarships
are “almost unheard of,” demonstrating how major professional
development systems may hinder athletes’ ability to play while
earning a college degree.205 Thus, the NCAA’s model, compared to
a privatized model, appears to ensure young athletes are not
subjected to gross underpayment and still receive the intrinsic
benefits of a college degree.
202 Tuition and Costs for Undergraduates, UNIV. OF DAYTON, https://
udayton.edu/affordability/undergraduate/tuition-approach/tuition-cost.php (last
visited Oct. 15, 2020).
203 Associated Press, College Athletes Continue to Earn Degrees at Record
Rates, USA TODAY (Nov. 8, 2017, 3:53 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/sports/college/2017/11/08/college-athletes-continue-earn-degrees-record-
rates/845611001/.
204 Travis Sawchik, Do We Even Need Minor League Baseball?, FIVE
THIRTY EIGHT (Sept. 9, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/do-
we-even-need-minor-league-baseball/ (“A Baseball America study of the 1981–
2010 drafts found that only 17.6 percent of drafted and signed players reached the
majors, and only 9.8 percent produced 0.1 career wins above replacement, a
minimal level of production.”). Further, an ex-Houston Astros official explained
their decision to consolidate their minor league teams because “[they] were trying
to support a bunch of players that had a less than one percent chance of making
the major leagues.” Id.
205 See Baumann, supra note 199 (detailing how minor league baseball has
disincentivized players to take college scholarships by offering a more expedient
route to the MLB).
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B. California’s Fair Pay to Play Act Faces Potential
Violations of the First Amendment and Anti-Trust
Implications
California’s Fair Pay to Play Act is the first enacted legislation
to prevent universities and the NCAA from denying college athletes
the ability to profit from their name and likeness.206 As California
Governor Gavin Newsom signed California’s Fair Pay to Play
Act207 on LeBron James’s HBO talk show, he opined the bill would
“initiate dozens of other states to introduce similar
legislation . . . [to] change college sports for the better by having
now the interests of the athletes finally on par with the interests of
the institutions . . . [thus] rebalancing that power arrangement.”208
Upon closer examination, the Act seems to have instead slyly
rebalanced student-athletes newfound bargaining freedoms in favor
of the universities.209 For example, under the Act, student-athletes
may not make deals which conflict with their university’s
endorsement deals:
(e) (1) A student athlete shall not enter into a contract
providing compensation to the athlete for use of the
athlete’s name, image, or likeness if a provision of
the contract is in conflict with a provision of the
athlete’s team contract.
(2) A student athlete who enters into a contract
providing compensation to the athlete for use of the
athlete’s name, image, or likeness shall disclose the
contract to an official of the institution, to be
designated by the institution.
(3) An institution asserting a conflict described in
paragraph (1) shall disclose to the athlete or the
athlete’s legal representation the relevant contractual
provisions that are in conflict.210
206 Murphy, supra note 32.
207 S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
208 The Shop Uninterrupted Season 2, Episode 4, at 4:15 (HBO 2019).
209 See Cal. S.B. 206 §§ 67456(e)(1)–(3) (limiting student-athletes’ ability to
seek endorsements if they conflict with their university’s endorsements).
210 Id.
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The restriction on a player’s ability to seek endorsement deals which
suit their individual brand compounds years of free speech
violations that,211 prior to the suggestion of the Act, scholars already
took issue with—namely, universities’ practice of forcing college
students to conform to their respective endorsement deals:
The value of free speech is the sine qua non of
academic life. It should never be compromised. The
NCAA needs an Association-wide, clear policy that
prohibits commercial contracts with sneaker or other
companies that include any form of no-taping or no-
criticism clauses. Further, if athletes wish to protest
labor or other policies of the sneaker companies in
Asia, they should not be required to wear their
products. Coaches who penalize such players should
be sanctioned. University contracts with sneaker or
other companies should only stipulate that athletes
will be encouraged to use certain products.212
New York’s proposal mirrors this problematic California Act
provision, and national uniformity could instigate a nationwide free-
speech problem.213 Illinois and Pennsylvania have already proposed
bills which directly mirror the California Act’s language,214 and the
NCAA has suggested that if it is going to change the way college
211 See ZIMBALIST, supra note 23, at 204 (demonstrating that even twenty
years ago, Zimbalist believed collegiate athletic programs violated student-
athletes’ free speech rights by demanding exclusive contracts with restrictive no-
taping and no-criticism clauses).
212 Id.
213 See S.B. 6722B, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 6438-a(5)(A) (N.Y. 2019)
(restraining the ability of an athlete to seek endorsement deals that conflict with
pre-existing university deals); see also Cal. S.B. 206 § 67456(e)(1), (denying
students’ stability to receive endorsements that conflict with pre-existing
university deals).
214 Alexia Fernandez Campbell, Free Labor from College Athletes May Soon
Come to an End, VOX (Oct. 3. 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/identities
/2019/10/3/20896738/california-fair-pay-to-play-act-college-athletes (explaining
that lawmakers in Illinois and Pennsylvania are in the process of introducing bills
which “mirror” California’s, while Congressional representatives have opined
that they want to introduce similar legislation “within the next year”).
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athletes are compensated, it wants uniformity among the laws.215
The current NCAA proposal not only mirrors this language, but
expands its limitations, denying athletes the ability to seek
endorsement deals from “an athletics equipment company or
manufacturer to publicize [that] the institution’s athletics program
uses its equipment.”216 Under this proposal, not only can players not
sign endorsements with competing athletics equipment companies,
but they also cannot sign with those that endorse their
universities.217 Therefore, if the California Act continues to be the
uniformmodel for compensating players, the free speech issue could
become a countrywide setback.
The California model also implicates the very same anti-trust
issues warned of inO’Bannon.218 Its statute mandates student athlete
endorsements may not conflict with their university’s
endorsements.219 This is highly problematic because the most
lucrative sports deals are typically offered by athletic clothing
215 Dan Murphy, NCAA to Meet Tuesday to Consider Allowing Athletes to
Profit from Endorsements, ESPN (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.espn.com/college-
sports/story/_/id/27952245/ncaa-meet-tuesday-consider-allowing-athletes-profit-
endorsements (responding to the idea of the NCAA having to comply with a
variety of different laws all aimed at allowing the compensation of student-
athletes, President Mark Emmert simply said, “[i]t can’t be done”).
216 Steve Berkowitz, NCAA Unveils Proposed Rule Changes Related to




218 See S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 67456(e)(1)–(3) (Cal. 2019)
(resolving conflicts in endorsement deals between a school and the athlete in favor
of the school, creating a trade restraint which limits the athletes options when
seeking potential endorsements); see also O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1057 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the NCAA violated anti-
trust laws by limiting the players’ ability to profit from their names, images and
likenesses, while the NCAA profited off licensing the same). See also Berkowitz,
supra note 216 (noting that the current NCAA proposal both resolves
endorsement conflicts in favor of the university and prevents athletes from signing
athletic equipment endorsement deals with companies that already sponsor their
university).
219 Cal. S.B. 206 § 67456(e)(1).
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brands,220 and such arrangements are very likely to conflict with
their university’s team-outfitting deals.221 Even in professional
sports, where entire leagues are outfitted by a single brand,222
players are often subject to severe penalties for wearing their
sponsors’ apparel without the express permission of the league.223
Otherwise, professional players are afforded wide latitude to engage
in endorsement deals.224 Accordingly, the ban on conflicting
endorsement deals reeks of the anti-trust complications that the
O’Bannon court sought to alleviate.225
Like the trade inhibiting practices of the NCAA at issue in
O’Bannon, the California Act has the inadvertent effect of giving
universities the exclusive ability to dictate which types of
athleticwear deals student-athletes may sign.226 The NCAA’s strict
amateurism model, criticized by the O’Bannon court for preventing
students from sharing in the NCAA’s ill-derived videogame
220 See Ranking the Top 10 Athletes by Endorsement Income for 2018,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept. 19, 2018), https://www.si.com/sports-illustrated
/2018/09/19/ranking-top-10-athletes-endorsement-deals-income (explaining that
LeBron James and Cristiano Ronaldo have lifetime agreements with Nike worth
$1 billion, and Roger Federer has a 10-year, $300 million agreement with
Uniqlo—all the largest endorsement deals each athlete respectively has agreed
to).
221 See Kish, supra note 20 (explaining that at least one college football
coach receives up to seven figure benefits for allowing Nike the right to
exclusively outfit their team, while many more coaches likely have similar deals).
222 Ahiza Garcia, NFL and Nike Sign 8-Year Contract for Uniforms, CNN
BUS. (Mar. 27, 2018, 5:30 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/03/27/news
/companies/nike-nfl-gear-contract/index.html (reporting that Nike extended its
right to outfit NFL teams through 2028 for an undisclosed amount after having
recently secured similar rights in the NBA for eight years for $1 billion).
223 Darren Rovell, Urlacher Gets Fined $100,000 for Super Bowl Stunt,
CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/id/18179918 (last updated Aug. 5, 2010, 4:33
PM).
224 See id. (explaining that professional athletes can seek endorsement deals,
even when they conflict with their league or team, with certain limitations
imposed by their respective leagues).
225 See O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1057
(9th Cir. 2015) (holding that improper exploitation of players’ likeness was anti-
competitive).
226 See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
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profits,227 is thus extended through the California Act. One
interference with the right to contract is traded for another. Students
will inevitably be forced into signing less lucrative endorsements
because of inevitable university conflicts.228 Indeed, the California
Act paves the way for athletic companies to pay universities more
for an outfitting endorsement, in consideration of the fact that
student-athletes of that university would also be required to sign
endorsements with that same athletic company to avoid a conflict.229
Therefore, as it stands, California’s Fair Pay to Play Act implicates
substantially similar anti-trust issues as those discussed in
O’Bannon.230
VI. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: ADOPTION OF THE OLYMPIC
AMATEURISMMODEL
The constitutional and anti-competitive issues revolving around
student-athlete compensation described herein could be ameliorated
by the NCAA’s adoption of the Olympic amateurism model.231
Indeed, other commentators, particularly in the aftermath of the
O’Bannon ruling, have urged that the NCAA should adopt the
Olympic model to remedy the anti-competitive effects of the
amateurism model.232 Now, in the context of widespread state
legislation and NCAA-promised reform, students should settle for
no less than reforming the NCAA in the image of the Olympic
model.233 Despite its steadfast defense of the current model and
227 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1067.
228 See S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 67456(e)(1) (Cal. 2019)
(noting in the legislative counsel’s digest that “[t]he bill would prohibit a student
athlete from entering into a contract providing compensation to the athlete for use
of the athlete’s name, image, or likeness if a provision of the contract is in conflict
with a provision of the athlete’s team contract”).
229 See id. (requiring that conflicting endorsements be resolved in favor of
the university, thus limiting the student’s options).
230 O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1057, 1058.
231 Alex Moyer, Note, Throwing Out the Playbook: Replacing the NCAA’s
Anticompetitive Amateurism Regime with the Olympic Model, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 761, 766 (2015).
232 Id.
233 S.B. 6722B, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S.B. 206, 2019–
2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); Almasy et al., supra note 37.
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expected sluggish approach to reform,234 NCAA president Mark
Emmert has admitted that the Olympic amateurism model should
receive “serious consideration.”235
Adopting Olympic amateurism would allow student-athletes to
bolster their baseline scholarship benefits with endorsements and
championship bonuses, without abandoning the NCAA’s fiscal
success. Furthermore, Olympic amateurism avoids First
Amendment violations and the reprisal of anti-trust issues inherent
in certain legislation, such as California’s Fair Pay to Play Act, by
allowing athletes to seek endorsements unencumbered by conflicts
with existing university deals.
Unlike New York’s proposal236 or a privatized model,237 the
Olympic model provides students the opportunity to maximize their
compensation while avoiding an employment relationship. Like
Olympic athletes’ performance-based stipends, student-athletes
could maintain their livelihood through a performance-based
scholarship from their university.238 College athletic scholarships
could also cover room and board—similar to Olympic Committee
stipends intended to cover living expenses.239 Further, under the
Olympic model, student-athletes would continue to benefit from a
college education, minimizing the risk of substituting their
educational potential for underpaying private developmental
leagues240—and thus avoiding the woes experienced by minor-
league baseball players.241
234 Testimony of Defendants’ Witness, Mark Emmert at 1768, O’Bannon v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014) No. C-09-
3329. (opining that developmental leagues are less successful than the NCAA due
to amateurism).
235 Tim Daniels,Mark Emmert: Olympic Model Worth Considering, Schools
Don’t Want to Pay Players, BLEACHER REPORT (Mar. 3, 2018), https://
bleacherreport.com/articles/2762467-mark-emmert-olympic-model-worth-
considering-ncaa-doesnt-want-to-pay-players.
236 N.Y. S.B. 6722B.
237 ZIMBALIST, supra note 23, at 199–200.
238 Kathleen Elkins, Here’s How Much U.S. Olympic Medalists Get Paid,
CNBC (Feb. 17, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/16/how-much-
olympic-athletes-get-paid.html.
239 Id.
240 Baumann, supra note 199.
241 Id.
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New avenues of student-athlete compensation under the
Olympic model would also not go so far as to disrupt the status quo
marketability of amateurism. The NCAA has stated its goal is to
“create . . . a path to enhance opportunities for student-athletes
while ensuring they compete against students and not
professionals.”242 Privatized models, like those that share traits with
the New York bill, do not meet this standard, because paying
student-athletes a pre-determined portion of ticket sales could
heighten their relationship with their respective sports program to
that of an employee. As the Seventh Circuit pointed out in Dawson,
such an expansion forsakes the very core concept of amateurism in
college sports by sidestepping the employee-employer questions,
and instead advancing college sports into a privatization scheme.243
The Olympic model avoids this result by allowing for
compensation beyond scholarships in only two ways: endorsement
deals and allowing individual nations to choose to payout so-called
“medal bonuses”244—neither of which would slip into a
privatization scheme by implicating an employment relationship.
Prior to Berger, the NCAA’s championship gift provision already
allowed for a college to provide student-athletes an item, such as a
ring, worth up to $415.245 Further, endorsement deals do not conflict
with prior jurisprudence because student-athletes would engage in
separate contracts—unrelated to the university—with endorsers.
242 Hobson, supra note 83.
243 See Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir.
2016).
244 Elkins, supra note 238.
245 Lindsay Schnell, You Won a College Football Playoff Championship
Ring—So Who Gets the Bling?, USA TODAY (Jan. 7, 2018, 6:51 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2018/01/07/college-football-playoff-
championship-rings/1011695001/. Although the bonus for an Olympic
championship is sizably greater—$37,500 for a gold medal compared to a $415
ring—Olympic team championship bonuses are split amongst the team. Applying
this to an NCAA basketball team of fifteen players, each player would get an
approximate $2,333 championship bonus, which is a significant raise. Elkins,
supra note 238. Under the Olympic standard, universities, like individual nations,
could retain wide latitude to determine the amount of the optional championship
bonus. Kathleen Elkins, Here’s How Much Olympic Athletes Earn in 12 Different
Countries, CNBC (Feb. 25, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/23
/heres-how-much-olympic-athletes-earn-in-12-different-countries.html.
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Adopting the Olympic amateurism model would allow student-
athletes to financially benefit from endorsements without restrictive
oversight. For example, Team USA Olympic athletes, like
professional athletes, have the freedom to independently market
their name, image and likeness, as long as they are in compliance
with Rule 40 of the Olympic Charter, which states:
Competitors, team officials and other team personnel
who participate in the Olympic Games may allow
their person, name, picture or sports performances to
be used for advertising purposes during the Olympic
Games in accordance with the principles determined
by the IOC Executive Board.246
During the Olympics, the purpose of the Rule 40 limitation is to
eliminate any potential public confusion among the endorsements of
the national teams, the respective Olympians, and the Olympic
Games itself. To initially comply with Rule 40, an athlete must
register their personal sponsors and consent to the rule’s
guidelines.247 Then, during the Rule 40 “blackout period”—a
monthlong period beginning immediately before and continuing
throughout the given year’s Olympic competitions248—public
sponsorship of an Olympian is banned unless that entity also
sponsored the Olympic Games.249 Recently, the International
Olympic Committee relaxed Rule 40 limitations so that now, during
the “blackout period,” personal sponsors may generically market250
246 Olympic Charter ch. 5, Rule 40 (2020); see also Associated Press, U.S.
Relaxes Sponsorship Rules for Olympic Athletes, USATODAY (Oct. 8, 2019, 9:22
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2019/10/08/us-relaxes-
sponsorship-rules-for-olympic-athletes/40286135/.
247 David O. Klein, Olympic Advertising Rules Scaled Back Prior to 2020
Games, LEXOLOGY (Oct. 28, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=7e6e025d-c232-4496-accc-76f516a58602.
248 Chris Chavez, What Is Rule 40? The IOC’s Rule on Non-Olympic
Sponsors, Explained, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 25, 2018), https://www.si.com
/olympics/2016/07/25/rule-40-explained-2016-olympic-sponsorship-blackout-
controversy (explaining that the blackout period ran from July 27, 2016 through
August 24, 2016).
249 Id.
250 Id. (explaining in this context that “generic” or “non-Olympic
advertising” is advertising or marketing which does not reference the Olympics at
all).
364 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
their product in support of an individual Olympian so long as the
Olympian does not redistribute those marketing materials.251 Instead
of redistribution, during the blackout period, Olympians may post
up to seven thank youmessages to personal sponsors, so long as they
do not include any reference to the Olympic Games or Team
USA.252 Otherwise, during any other time of the year, Olympians
have unlimited freedom to promote themselves. If the NCAA
adopted this same model, collegiate athletes could market
themselves independently to personal sponsors253 and enter
endorsement contracts for their appearance in advertisements, social
media posts, and events, while preserving the NCAA’s core value
of student versus student competition.254
The Olympic amateur endorsement model’s lack of
cumbersome restrictions would also alleviate the First Amendment
issues posed by California’s Fair Pay to Play Act, by allowing
student-athletes more freedom to choose their personal sponsors.255
Although student-athletes may be subject to restrictions similar to
those in Rule 40, they could, along with their personal sponsors—
depending on whether the athlete is in-season—still thank or
recognize one another through social media posts and
advertisements.256 With certain limitations, the Olympic model does
not require athletes to conform to their sponsorships;257 rather it
251 U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMM., ATHLETE MARKETING FOR THE
OLYMPIC AND PARALYMPIC GAMES TOKYO 2020 RULE 40 GUIDANCE FOR THE
UNITED STATES 4 (Oct. 7, 2019) (“[D]uring the Rule 40 period, athletes cannot
retweet or repost generic marketing content promoting brands, products or
services.”).
252 Id. at 6–7 (explaining that thank you messages online may be directed at
personal sponsors but cannot specifically reference the Olympics nor the product
the sponsor makes).
253 Personal sponsors are companies which are not official sponsors of the
Olympics or the sponsored Olympian’s respective national team. See id.
254 See 2020–21 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL 1 (Aug. 1, 2020) (noting that
NCAA Constitution Article 1, Provision 1.2 sets the NCAA’s purpose to “initiate,
stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for student athletes”)
255 U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMM., supra note 251, at 2.
256 Id.
257 Compare id. (allowing Olympic athletes to support personal sponsors that
“[do] not compete with official sponsors”), with S.B. 206, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg.
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seeks to merely eliminate any potential intellectual property abuse
or brand confusion that may occur between the personal sponsor and
the team rather than just the athlete.258
Lastly, the Olympic amateur endorsement model would alleviate
the anti-trust issues described in O’Bannon, which are the likely
result of California’s Fair Pay to Play Act. It would effectively
prevent universities from leveraging sponsorship with its control
over student-athlete endorsements, precluding those institutions
from creating a monopoly over student-athlete endorsement
contracts. Again, the Olympic amateurism model’s lack of
restrictive limitations is instructive. In contrast to Rule 40’s simple
online registration requirements,259 California’s Act requires an
after-the-fact process where the student-athlete and school have to
engage in a continuous, back-and-forth dialogue.260 The Act
mandates that student-athletes cannot sign endorsement contracts
that conflict with a provision of their university’s contract.261 Under
the Olympic model, except during the “blackout period,” there are
no limitations on an athlete’s ability to secure sponsorships. Unlike
the present system, which basically operates as a “cartel,” adopting
the Olympic model would empower student-athletes to demand
more from colleges when deciding which to attend.262
CONCLUSION
Despite its fabled beginnings, amateurism may be nearing its
deathbed. Although the NCAA has identified important reasons for
Sess. § 67456(e)(1) (Cal. 2019) (restricting a student-athlete’s ability to promote
brands that conflict with the team’s contract).
258 U.S. OLYMPIC & PARALYMPIC COMM., supra note 251, at 2, 4.
259 See id. at 3 (explaining the instructions for Rule 40 registration).
260 Cal. S.B. 206 § 67456(e)(2)–(3).
261 Id.
262 O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 802 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th
Cir. 2015); seeU.S.OLYMPIC&PARALYMPICCOMM., supra note 251, at 2 (noting
that the Olympic model allows Olympians to sign endorsement deals which,
applied in the NCAA context, could allow students to choose schools which
would maximize their ability to receive endorsements).
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continuing to incorporate amateurism,263 with the introduction of
California’s Pay to Play Act,264 and the subsequent announcement
by the NCAA to eventually allow students athletes to profit off their
names and likenesses, a shift in the model seems necessary and
imminent. The Olympic amateurism model has slowly allowed
athletes more freedom to accept endorsements, in a manner which
inspires hope for the future of NCAA athletics. If fully adopted by
the NCAA, the Olympic model will finally allow student-athletes to
simultaneously self-monetize and earn a college degree, all while
developing their skills for professional sports.
263 Testimony of Defendants’ Witness, Mark Emmert at 1759, O’Bannon v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014) No. C-09-
3329.
264 Cal. S.B. 206.
